The effect of church tax on church membership by Lyytikäinen, Teemu & Santavirta, Torsten
Working
Papers 20
Government  
Institute for 
Economic Research
The effect of church tax on  
church membership
Teemu Lyytikäinen
Torsten Santavirta Working Papers 20 December 2010

  
 
VATT WORKING PAPERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
The effect of church tax on church 
membership 
 
Teemu Lyytikäinen * 
Torsten Santavirta ** 
 
Valtion taloudellinen tutkimuskeskus 
Government Institute for Economic Research 
Helsinki 2010 
  
 
* Teemu Lyytikäinen, London School of Economics, Spatial Economics 
Research Centre  
** Torsten Santavirta, Department of Economics, Aalto University School of 
Economics and Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI), Stockholm 
University  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN 978-951-561-957-0 (nid.) 
ISBN 978-951-561-958-7 (PDF) 
 
ISSN 1798-0283 (nid.) 
ISSN 1798-0291 (PDF) 
 
 
Valtion taloudellinen tutkimuskeskus 
Government Institute for Economic Research 
Arkadiankatu 7, 00100 Helsinki, Finland 
 
Oy Nord Print Ab 
Helsinki, December 2010 
Graphic design: Niilas Nordenswan 
  
 
The effect of church tax on church membership  
 
Government Institute for Economic Research 
VATT Working Papers 20/2010  
 
Teemu Lyytikäinen – Torsten Santavirta 
 
Abstract  
In this study we examine the effect of church tax on the church membership 
decision using Finnish data. We present both descriptive statistics from an 
opting-out website and econometric evidence exploiting the panel structure of a 
large individual-level data set. Our descriptive analysis shows that opting-out is 
concentrated towards the last days of the year, i.e., the last chance to avoid 
paying church tax for the entire coming year. Our econometric evidence suggests 
however, that the average effect of tax incentives in the whole population is very 
small in magnitude, while being statistically significant. The price elasticity of 
church membership is roughly -0.01. In addition, we find that church 
membership dropped substantially when a law change made opting-out 
significantly easier. This finding suggests that transaction costs play an important 
role in the membership decision. 
Key words: Church tax, church membership, transaction cost 
JEL classification numbers: H24, H31, Z12 
 
Tiivistelmä  
Tässä tutkimuksessa analysoidaan kirkollisveron vaikutusta kirkkoonkuulumis-
päätöksiin hyödyntäen suomalaista tilastoaineistoa. Esittelemme sekä internetin 
kautta tapahtuvaa kirkosta eroamista koskevaa kuvailevaa analyysia että suureen 
yksilötason paneeliaineistoon perustuvaa ekonometrista analyysia. Kuvaileva 
analyysimme osoittaa, että kirkosta eroaminen keskittyy vuoden loppuun, jolloin 
on viimeinen mahdollisuus välttyä maksamasta kirkollisveroa tulevana vuonna. 
Ekonometriset tulokset viittaavat kuitenkin siihen, että koko väestön tasolla 
veroinsentiivien keskimääräinen vaikutus kirkkoon kuulumiseen on hyvin pieni, 
vaikkakin tilastollisesti merkitsevä. Kirkon jäsenyyden hintajousto on noin -0,01 
eli hinnan noustessa prosentilla jäsenmäärä vähenee 0,01 prosentilla. Tuloksem-
me näyttävät lisäksi, että kirkkoon kuuluminen väheni merkittävästi kirkosta 
eroamista helpottavan lakimuutoksen myötä. Tulos viittaa siihen, että eroamis-
  
 
prosessiin kuluva aika ja vaiva sekä eroajan yksityisyyden suoja vaikuttavat 
merkittävästi jäsenyyspäätökseen.  
Asiasanat: Kirkollisvero, kirkon jäsenyys, transaktiokustannus 
JEL-luokittelu: H24, H31, Z12 
 
 
1 Introduction
Even though most European countries are secularized, state church continues to
have a potent stronghold on society as a whole and on peoples daily life in many
countries. However, there is a high rate of members opting out from church each
year, particularly in the Nordic countries. The declining popularity of such a central
institution in society has given rise to surprisingly little study by economists on the
implications of the cost of participation on peoples decision to participate. In other
social sciences, such as sociology, the declining religious adherence, or secularization,
has produced a number of articles.1
In this study we examine the e¤ect of the cost of church membership, i.e., the
amount of money paid in the form of church tax, on the membership decision using
Finnish data. In Finland 81.7 percent of the population belonged to a state church
(Evangelican Lutheran Church of Finland or Finnish Orthodox Church) as of 2007.2
Each year roughly 85 percent of the newborns are baptized into state church. The rate
of individuals who opt out from state church has however increased drastically over
the last years while the rate of adults who join back has remained constant. In year
2006 roughly 35,000 individuals opted out from church while some 10,000 individuals
joined back (after having opted out at some point during adulthood). Surveys often
1See Francis and Katz (2000) for an extensive overview of the study of joining and leaving
religion in di¤erent disciplines.
2In Germany roughly 67 percent of the population of 82.1 million belonged to one or the other
of the two state churches; the Protestant Church and the Catholic Church 27.2 million.
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show that the principal reason for opting out is the church tax.3 ;4 This implies that
people, at least to some extent, weigh their benets of church membership against the
cost of being a member in making their participation decision. Each year a person
decides whether she wants to be a member or not in the following year. The decision
is made for the following year as the Finnish Tax Administration (FTA) revises each
individuals membership status in January 1 each year. In other words, one is tax
liable the entire year in the year of opting out and tax liable the entire following year
after the year of joining (but exempt from taxes in the year of joining).
There is to our knowledge no study by economists on the implications of church
tax, i.e., the cost of membership, for peoples religious participation. One reason
is perhaps, that the religious communities are in relatively few countries funded
by a pay-to-play system, such as by a tax levied on their members income.5 In
most Western countries a church tax would be inconsistent with the constitutional
separation of church and state. Finland is however not the only exception. For
instance, Austria, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland all impose a similar tax
3In Finland the church tax is an separate income tax. It varies between 0.75 and 2.25 percent
depending on the municipality of residence and is set by a democratically elected parish council.
Figure 1 displays a distribution of the church tax rates in 2006. For comparison, the tax is in
Germany is 8 or 9 percent of the income tax, i.e., a person paying an income tax of 20 percent pays
a church tax of 1.6 percent.
4Heino, Salonen, Rusama, and Ahonen (1997) and Lumijärvi (1998) both nd in their survey
studies that the high cost is the main reason for leaving church in Finland, 24 percent and 28
percent of the surveyees respectively, being of that opinion. In a survey from the UK by Richter
and Francis (1998) only 1 percent mention the high cost as the main reason for leaving church.
5Daniel Hamermesh writes "....religious organizations are public goods [in the United States]; its
easy to enjoy the services o¤ered (pun intended) without paying your fair share of the costs."[The
New York Times, Freakonomics Blog, October 14, 2008] Membership to state church is not a
requirement for enjoying some of the services provided by church even in a pay-to-play system.
Churchs approach tends to be rather inclusive with respect to, e.g., foreign non-members and its
charity extends to all people in need. See Appendix C for a list of services that are limited for
members.
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on members of their largest religious congregations. Another reason for the lack of
research on the e¤ect of church tax on membership decisions may be the di¢ culty
to separate the e¤ect of the price each person actually pays for being a member
of church from the e¤ect of income, since the church tax is directly proportional
to income in countries like Germany. Finland has dual income taxation, with a
progressive payroll tax and a at rate capital income tax. Since church tax is levied
only on wage income, the price of church membership does not vary one-to-one with
income. Moreover, church tax rates vary substantially across regions and over time.
We present both descriptive statistics and formal econometric evidence exploiting
the panel structure of a large individual-level data set to establish how economic
incentives a¤ect the participation decision of being a member of state church.6 Our
rst empirical argument relies on the timing of opting out within the year. Members
are tax liable the entire calendar year in the year of opting out. Thus, an increased
rate of opting out towards the end of the year would suggest that the ones who
opt out have a positive valuation for the religious activities to which membership
entitles. Our formal econometric analysis relies on individual level variation over
time in church tax paid. Controlling for individual heterogeneity in unobservable
time-invariant potential confounders, we explore how the variation over time in the
individuals cost of membership a¤ects her probability of membership. The analysis
allows us to quantify the impact of the price paid for membership, in the form of
church tax, on the decision to participate in church.
In our descriptive analysis using data on the timing of opting out from church,
6Our data set contains 10,501,554 individual/year cells for 1,142,977 individuals over the years
1996-2006.
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we nd that individuals delay their opting out decisions towards the end of the
year, i.e., when no additional cost of membership is incurred, membership is on
average prolonged. Our econometric evidence supports the idea that opting out is,
to some extent, an economic decision. The e¤ect of church tax is however, while being
statistically signicant, very small in magnitude. The elasticity of church membership
with respect to price evaluated at the means of all variables is roughly -0.01. An
interesting additional nding is that church membership dropped substantially when
the law change made opting out signicantly easier.
This study contributes to the public nance literature by providing the rst em-
pirical analysis on the impact of church tax on church membership. It also contributes
to the growing elds of empirical literature that have studied the causes and conse-
quences of religious participation and highlighted the interaction between economic
decisions and the religious sector.7 Literature on the causes of religious participation
has, for instance, documented that religious giving and religious attendance are sub-
stitutes (Gruber 2004). Studies on the consequences of religious participation have
mainly found positive e¤ects. Gruber (2005) nds that increased religious partici-
pation leads to higher educational attainment and income. Deheija, DeLeire, and
Luttmer (2007) nd, using data from a consumer expenditure survey and a life satis-
faction survey, that households who contribute to a religious organization are better
able to insure their consumption against income shocks, and that attending religious
services may enable individuals to insure their happiness against income shocks. An-
other interesting strand of literature has studied the interaction of the public sector
7Iannaccone (1998) discusses extensively the economic models of religiosity.
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spending and the religious sector. Gruber and Hungerman (2007) and Hungerman
(2005) nd that government spending crowds out charitable church activities.
It is already at this stage important to emphasize that we are solely examining
the decision on membership to church, not religiosity in itself. We thus refer to
religious participation in a somewhat di¤erent manner than our predecessors in the
literature, who measure religious participation as attendance at religious services (e.g.
Gruber 2004) or the number of hours devoted to religious services. In other words,
we make no aspirations on explaining the change in religiosity, beliefs, or values
of individuals or societies. Churchs popularity might decline as people nd other
ways than state church to practice their spirituality or religiosity. The increasing
popularity of opting out from state church may thus not be a consequence of decline
in belief among people.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional
setting. Section 3 presents the data used in the econometric analysis. Section 4
presents the results from the regression analysis and Section 5 concludes.
2 Institutional Setting and the Website Data Ev-
idence
Membership or a¢ liation to a state church in Finland implies that an individual is
allowed to participate in religious services provided by the church and contributes
to the churchs nances through payroll tax. The tax rate is between 0.75 and 2.25
percent of the individuals taxable earned income (wage and certain benets less
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deductions) varying across municipalities. As mentioned in Section (1) ; the FTA
updates each individuals church membership status yearly according to membership
status at the rst day of the calendar year. From the leavers point of view, this
implies that, in the year of opting out, she can prolong her a¢ liation to church until
the last day of the year without incurring any extra costs. The church tax for the
last year of a¢ liation can thus be considered as a sunk cost from the rst day of the
year on.
The Law of freedom of conviction was revised in year 2003 enabling the ling of
the opting out announcement by mail.8 Prior to the August 1, 2003 leavers needed
to hand in the announcement personally to an administrative council. From an
economic point of view the interesting feature of the change in legislation is that it
dramatically lowered the transaction costs of the opting out procedure. Even though
opting out did not imply any pecuniary costs except for the potential bus ticket or
parking fee, the time and e¤ort spent on this procedure at regular o¢ ce hours is
a relatively high transaction cost. Moreover, having to face church personnel when
ling the opting-out form may have caused fear for stigma and thus have constituted
a signicant mental cost to many people before the law change.
The new law of freedom of conviction combined with the law change that gave
equal legally binding status to emails as to traditional mail made opting out from
state church possible via email.9 This inspired a society of atheists, called Free-
thinkers of Finland, to launch a website, through which the opting out announce-
8The revised Law of freedom of conviction (6.6.2003/453) was passed on June 6, 2003 and put
into action on August 1, 2003.
9The Law on electronic communication in the activities of public authorities (24.1 13/2003) was
passed on January 24, 2003.
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ment can be led online for free by lling a form. The name of the website is
www.eroakirkosta., which directly translates to English as www.optoutfromchurch.
(henceforth simply the "website"), and it has gained rapidly in popularity since its
launching in November 2003. Meanwhile, the yearly rate of people opting out has
increased nearly at the same rate as the increase in people opting out via the website.
This suggests that the increased rate of opting out is explained by people that would
not have opted out without the presence of the website but after its launching found
it worthwhile.
We look at the complete daily data for years 2006, 2007, and 2008 on individuals
who opted out from state church through the website. This data was obtained from
the website providers. We have information on age, gender, municipality of residence
and exact time of sending the online form. In year 2006, roughly 29,500 persons opted
out from state church using the website (84.4 percent of the total number of opting
outs), in 2007 the same number already exceeded 32,800 (86.7 percent of the total
number of opting outs).10 This data does not allow for formal econometric analysis
but combined with the aforementioned institutional features it enables us to form
some stylized facts about peoples opting out behavior. Given that the cost of the
last year of membership is pre-determined, we can make inferences about peoples
behavior based on their timing of opting out over the calendar year. If the benets
from belonging to church were zero, we would not expect to observe any pattern
in the timing of peoples ling of the opting out announcement, only an in time
10The website conducts a voluntary online survey for a random sample of online-leavers. In
August 2010 roughly 2,446 individuals were shown the survey and 612 responses were received. 28
percent of the responses included the words tax or money.
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uniformly distributed stream of people who opt out.
Figure 1 presents the monthly opting out frequencies in 2007. The immediate
observation is that the frequency of people opting out is steadily increasing from
June onwards until December. Bearing in mind that the monthly church tax is paid
for the entire year in the year of opting out, the increase towards the end of the year
suggests that people optimize membership by delaying the opting out decision. The
two other peaks, January and April coincide with the press release of the previous
years opting out statistics by the website providers and the tax proposal for year 2006
respectively.11 Those who turned 18 in year 2007 are excluded from the data because
they are expected to opt out on di¤erent grounds than the rest of the population as
anyone is legally allowed to opt out (without the parents permission) only the day
after she turned 18.
Figure 2 shows the daily opting out frequencies during December 2007. The
highest frequency (which also is the maximum daily frequency of the whole year)
coincides with the last working day of the year, which is New Years Eve. This
strengthens the view that individuals who opt out have a tendency to delay their
opting out announcement as long as they do not incur additional costs of belonging
to church. Another interpretation of the gures is that a large part of the people
who opted out would still belong to church if membership were free.
The individuals who opt out through the website arrive to the website through
di¤erent paths of which Google search engine is one of the most frequent gateways.
By looking at the reference paths of those who ended up at the website via Google
11The tax proposal for the previous years taxes arrives by mail traditionally during the rst
weeks in April.
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(and opted out via it during the same session) we can form a picture of potential rea-
sons for opting out. Most people "googled" some combination of the words opt(ing)
out, from, church. However, a considerable number of persons ended up opting
out by entering some combination including the word "tax" in the Google search en-
gine. Figure 3 depicts the monthly pattern of Google tax-ratios, i.e., the monthly
number of people who entered by googlingon the word tax in relation to the total
number of opting outs that month. We nd the same monthly pattern here, that
is, the word tax becomes a more common search criterion towards the end of the
year. This observation suggests that the mass of people who opt out for tax reasons
is thicker towards the end of the year. We do the same descriptive analysis for year
2006 and nd no di¤erence in the patterns, suggesting regularity in the opting out
behavior of people.12
The stylized fact that we can take home from the above descriptive exercise is
that: when people do not incur additional costs from belonging to church they delay
their opting out announcement. While the website data allows us to analyze peoples
opting out behavior and gives some indications that church tax matters in peoples
opting out decision, we need more detailed data to evaluate whether tax incentives
play a signicant role relative to other factors in making the participation decision.
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on individual-level income and tax data
linked to individual and household characteristics.
12We look separately at the website data for years 2006 and 2008. The pattern of opting out
is essentially the same in these years. The corresponding Figures 1, 2, and 3 for these years are
available from the authors.
9
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
We use the Finnish Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data (FLEED) released by
Statistics Finland and containing information on all Finnish individuals in the age
group 16-70 years living in Finland. Our panel contains a random sample of 1/3
of the total population between the years 1996 and 2006. There are 10,501,554
individual/year cells for 1,142,977 individuals in the data.13 Appendix A describes
the variables and sample selection.
FLEED does not contain a specic variable on membership to state church. We
infer church membership of an individual in a particular year from the information
on whether she paid church tax during that particular year of observation. The
individual-level variation over time in church tax paid results from two components:
municipality-specic changes in the church tax rate and changes in the individuals
own taxable income. The tax base for the church tax consists of wage and taxable
transfers less deductions. This tax base is the same as for the local income tax. Thus,
a person who did not pay any church tax in year t, but paid local income tax in the
same year must have opted out from state church before the start of the calendar
year t.14
To address our research question it is also key to determine how much each non-
member would have paid in church tax each year had she been a member. The
13Of the 1,142,977 individuals in the data 48,013 changed their membership status once, 4,883
did so twice, and 502 did so more than twice between 1996-2006.
14We exclude all individual/year cells with zero local income tax.
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computed church tax for non-members is based on their taxable pay roll analogously
to the way the tax is calculated for members. More precisely, taxable gross wage
including transfers less deductions is multiplied by the relevant church tax rate for the
municipality of residence in year t.15 We cross validate our method for calculating
the hypothetical tax values by comparing them with the observed church tax for
the observations with non-zeros for church tax. The correlation between computed
church tax and the observed church tax is 0:99 for members. In what follows we use
the computed tax measure for both members and non-members. Figure 4 shows that
the distribution of the ratio of computed church tax and the observed church tax for
church members is narrow with most observations obtaining the same value using our
computation method as the observed tax paid. The scatter plot in Figure 5 brings
further support for the accuracy of our method since most of the mass concentrates
on the 45 degree line. Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the data for our
sample.
3.2 Regression results
To investigate systematically how church membership varies with the church tax paid
we estimate by a linear probability model with individual xed e¤ects:
15Since transfers and deduction are not available in FLEED we obtain the correct tax base (wage
- deductions + transfers) for each individual/year from the Tax Income Database at Statistics
Finland.
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Memberit = 0 + 1 (Church Tax)it 1 + 2 (Household Income)it 1
+a0Xit + i + county +  t + "it: (1)
The outcome variable is a dummy variable for membership to state church of
individual i in year t: The explanatory variable of interest is computed church tax
liability in year t 1. Household income is the sum of gross wage and capital income
of the household and is included to control for the income e¤ect that expands the
budget set. Church tax and household income are not collinear as church tax is levied
on individual income.16 Moreover, variation in church tax rates and the Finnish dual
income tax system imply di¤erential variation in income and church tax even for
singles. The correlation between the church tax variable and the income variable is
roughly 0.5. We include a vector of time-varying individual and household charac-
teristics, Xit; and vectors of individual, county, and year dummies.17 The inclusion
of individual xed e¤ects eliminates all time-invariant individual heterogeneity and
identication is based on variation in individual church tax liabilities over time. In
other words, all omitted variables that may be correlated with church tax and are
constant over time, such as presumably norms and values related to ones family and
upbringing, are controlled for. County xed e¤ects control for unobserved regional
di¤erences in the quality of services provided by the church and other regional factors.
16The spouse identier is non-missing only for the married individuals or the ones cohabitating.
For, e.g., singles the household income variable will be the sum on their payroll and capital gains.
17Although the Church tax rate varies within municipalities over time in the data, the researcher
only observes the county identier (not a municipality identier) for each individual. This way
Statistics Finland prevents the potential identication of individuals.
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In some specications we also include time-specic county xed e¤ects to control for
regional shocks. Individual and household characteristics included in the regression
are a dummy for kids in the household, a dummy for whether the adult members
of the household are married, a dummy for whether the individual is divorced, ve
dummies for level of education and eight dummies for household size.
Results from estimating equation (1) are presented in Tables 2-4. Table 2 shows
a consistent, negative e¤ect of the amount of church tax paid in year t   1 on the
probability of being a member of state church in year t. The coe¢ cient -0.0102 in the
rst row and column represents the marginal e¤ect, 1, multiplied by one standard
deviation of church tax. The coe¢ cient implies that a one standard deviation (143
euros) increase in church tax in year t 1 leads to a 1.02 percentage point decrease in
the probability of being a member of the church in year t. The estimated impact of
church tax is 0.59 percentage points in column 2 where year dummies are included.
In the most demanding regression in column (4) (including year*county dummies)
the response is down to 0.50 percentage points, still being statistically signicant
at 1 percent level.18 Considering that a one standard deviation increase in church
tax corresponds to a 63 percent increase in the price of membership on average, the
e¤ect is not economically signicant. The price elasticity of church membership for
the coe¢ cients obtained in the regression reported in column (4), evaluated at the
means of all variables, is roughly -0.01.
Instead of reporting the year e¤ects in Table 2, we depict them in Figure 6 for the
18We also test for forward looking behavior by including contemporaneous church tax instead
of its rst lag in the equivalent regression as the one reported in column (4) of Table 2. We nd
signicantly weaker e¤ects. The coe¢ cient (t-statistic) for current church tax, reported equivalently
as in Table 2, is -0.0022 (15.52).
13
whole sample (regression reported in column (3) of Table 2) and in Figure 7 for singles
(column (1) of Table 3). Membership is trending negatively throughout the entire
period of observation but there is a clear kink in the trend in 2003. The probability
of membership dropped by an average annual rate of roughly 0.1 percentage points
during the years 1998-2003, i.e., the years preceding the law reform, and by an average
annual rate of 0.6 percentage points during the post-reform years 2004-2006. Joining
was not facilitated in any way in 2003, thus, conditional on all other things a¤ecting
the opting out behavior being continuous in 2003, the kink can be attributed to
the law reform that facilitated opting out and the website. Additional descriptive
statistics reported in Table B-1 of Appendix B shows that the rate of adults joining
church after having opted out at some point after age 18 has remained constant over
time, suggesting that the kink in the year e¤ects is driven by the law reform and not
a simultaneous drop in the overall popularity of the church.
The coe¢ cient on income is positive in column (1) of Table 2 but becomes neg-
ative in columns (2)-(4) when more controls are included. The magnitude of the
coe¢ cient is small in all specications. The negative coe¢ cient on income suggests
that church membership may be an inferior good which is substituted by other types
of consumption goods as income increases. In good times the range of consumption
opportunities is greater and time and resources may be spent on secular opportuni-
ties. Hungerman and Gruber (2008) nd that religious participation is a¤ected by
secular competition for temporal and monetary resources. Note however, that we
unfortunately lack the data needed to calculate disposable household income. We
argue however that our proxy for disposable income, i.e., gross household income,
14
captures su¢ ciently well demand responses to income changes. Thus the e¤ect of
church tax is clean from income e¤ects.
Table 3 reports the results from estimating equation (1) for subsamples by house-
hold type. The coe¢ cients once again imply the product of 1 and one standard
deviation of Church Tax. The results show that singles tend to be most responsive
to changes in church tax whereas couples without children are the least responsive.
The coe¢ cient on income is negative for all subgroups while being the least negative
for couples with children.
In Table 4 the results from a similar exercise as in Table 3 are reported, the
argument dening the subgroups this time being age. The church tax estimate is
more than twice as large for young adults (30 years) as for the middle-aged (31-
55 years). For the elderly (56 years) the church tax estimate is positive. While
statistically signicant, the coe¢ cients are still small in magnitude and thus far from
being economically signicant.
4 Conclusion
This paper examines the e¤ect of the cost of church membership in the form of
church tax on church membership decisions. Analysis of data on the timing of online-
opting-outs conrms that church tax does play a role in the membership decision.
We quantify the e¤ect of church tax by estimating the e¤ect of church tax liability
on church membership status while controlling for individual-level xed e¤ects and
a rich set of control variables. The structure of the Finnish income tax system
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allows us to separate the e¤ect of church tax from the e¤ect of income. We nd that
church tax has a negative and statistically highly signicant e¤ect on the membership
probability. However, our core estimates imply that the price elasticity of church
membership is very low. The price elasticity of church membership evaluated at the
means of all variables is roughly -0.01. Thus, the participation decision seems to
be mainly driven by non-economic variables. Another implication of our ndings is
that the Finnish state church does not appear to set tax rates so as to maximize tax
revenue. According to our results, a one o¤ 10 percent increase in the church tax
in 2006 would have increased the annual tax revenue by 75 million euros (from 763
million euros to 838 million euros).19
The estimates of the year e¤ects suggest that a law reform that made opting
out from church signicantly easier had a negative e¤ect on church membership.
The probability of membership dropped by an average annual rate of roughly 0.1
percentage points during the pre-reform years 1998-2003 and by an average annual
rate of 0.6 percentage points during the post-reform years. Extrapolating our results
out of sample to a counterfactual in which online opting out were not made possible
through a law reform in 2003 and the number of opting outs remained at the pre-
reform rates (and rate of deaths, number of baptizings and tax rates remained the
same), the church would have had roughly 65,000 more members in 2006, i.e., the
existence of the website has until the end of 2006 implied a roughly fteen times
larger loss of members than one incurred by a one o¤ 10 percent increase in tax
19The number of members were 4,348,442 in 2006. A -0:01 elasticity coe¢ cient implies a 0:1
percent decrease in membership from a 10 percent increase in prices, i.e., a loss of 4,348 members.
At the average church tax in 2006 ( 267 nominal euros), the loss through decreasing membership
caused by a 10 percent increase in tax rates implies  1; 2 million euros.
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rates.
Our estimates for the price elasticity of church membership suggest that, even
though many people who leave church may perceive the high cost as the principal
reason for opting out, at the level of the whole population membership decisions
are not very sensitive to economic factors. Our analysis shows that the church
membership decision is characterized by a high degree of inertia. People tend to
adhere to the default option regardless of the price of membership but the advent
of technologies such as online opting-out may make a di¤erence to the opting-out
behavior.20 The dynamism of church membership has increased signicantly since
2003 when the opening of the opting-out website increased the annual amount of
leavers as opposed to joiners. The out-ow from church triggered by the website
may weaken somewhat over time as the pool of potential leavers who take advantage
of the new opting-out technology runs dry. The resulting transition towards a church
with fewer members is likely to persist unless the joining patterns change. As the
population is aging the demographic changes are also not on the state churchs side
as fewer children are likely to be baptized relative to the number of late members.
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Tables
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Observations Mean Std.Dev.
Member of state church (pct) 10,501,554 0.85 0.36
Real church tax 8,915,018 224,36 142,37
Computed real church tax 10,501,554 229.51 143.78
Annual real household income (1000 EUR) 10,501,554 34.00 23.30
Age 10,501,554 44.95 13.21
Kids 10,501,554 0.39 0.49
Married 10,501,554 0.54 0.50
Divorced 10,501,554 0.13 0.33
Years of education 10,501,554 12.49 3.27
Family size 10,501,554 2.56 1.35
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Table 2. The E¤ect of Church Tax on Church Membership
Dependent variable: (Member of State Church)t (yes=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Church Tax)t 1 -0.0102 -0.0059 -0.0051 -0.0050
(66.44) (39.19) (34.46) (33.90)
(Household Income)t 1 (1000 EUR) 0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0019 -0.0020
(15.86) (13.75) (18.14) (18.49)
Kids -0.0009 -0.0009
(3.70) (3.62)
Married 0.00016 0.0003
(0.61) (0.91)
Divorced -0.0040 -0.0039
(14.57) (14.26)
Observations 9,193,806 9,193,806 9,193,806 9,193,806
R2 0.0020 0.0084 0.0090 0.0096
The entries in Table 2 represent the coe¢ cients from OLS regressions multiplied by one standard
deviation of the particular variable (see Table 1 for summary statistics). Robust t-statistics are
reported in the parentheses. All regressions include individual xed e¤ects. Columns (2)-(4)
additionally include year xed e¤ects. Column additionally (3) includes region xed e¤ects
(19 county dummies), 4 dummies for level of education, 7 family size dummies. Column (4)
additionally include region*year xed e¤ects.
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Table 3. The E¤ect of Church Tax on Church Membership - by type of household
Dependent variable: (Member of State Church)t (yes=1)
Couple, Couple
Singles no kids with kids
(Church Tax)t 1 -0.0096 -0.0036 -0.0029
(26.01) (15.29) (14.77)
(Household Income)t 1 (1000 EUR) -0.00030 -0.0021 -0.0010
(1.46) (14.29) (7.13)
Observations 2,080,219 2,847,790 3,530,701
R2 0.0139 0.0066 0.0066
The entries in Table 3 represent the coe¢ cients from OLS regressions. Robust t-statistics are
reported in the parentheses. All regressions include the same controls as column (4) in Table
2 excluding 7 family size dummies, dummy for kids, dummy for divorced, dummy for married.
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Table 4. The E¤ect of Church Tax on Church Membership - by age
Dependent variable: (Member of State Church)t (yes=1)
19-30 31-55 55<
(Church Tax)t 1 -0.0062 -0.0025 0.0008
(18.04) (13.43) (3.78)
(Household Income)t 1 (1000 EUR) 0.0015 -0.0009 0.0003
(5.37) (6.56) (2.39)
Observations 1,441,323 5,413,285 2,339,198
R2 0.0223 0.0079 0.0021
The entries in Table 4 represent the coe¢ cients from OLS regressions. Robust t-statistics are
reported in the parentheses. All regressions include the same controls as column (4) in Table
2.
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Figure 1: The distribution of church tax rates in 2006. Source: Evangelican
Lutheran Church of Finland, www.evl..
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Figure 2: Monthly opting-out frequencies in 2007 (excluding all who turn 18 in
2007). Source: The website called www.eroakirkosta. (www.optoutfromchurch.).
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Figure 3: Daily opting-out frequencies in Dec 2007 (The last working day of the
year was Dec 31). Source: The website called www.eroakirkosta.
(www.optoutfromchurch.).
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Figure 4: The monthly ratio of entering the website via googling (church)taxper
all opting outs in each month. Source: The website called www.eroakirkosta.
(www.optoutfromchurch.).
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Figure 5: Distribution of "Computed Church Tax/Church Tax"-ratio for all church
tax payers. Source: Church tax from Finnish Longitudinal Employer-Employee
Data Set. For computed church tax we obtain the tax base from the Individual Tax
Registy and church tax rates per municipality/year from the Income Distribution
Survey at Statistics Finland.
28
Figure 6: Plotting church tax against computed church tax for all church tax
payers. Source: Church Tax from Finnish Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data
Set. For computed church tax we obtain the exact tax base for each individual from
the Taxable Income database compiled by Statistics Finland and church tax rates
per municipality/year from the Income Distribution Survey at Statistics Finland.
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Figure 7: The coe¢ cients for the year xed e¤ects in the regression reported in
column (3) of Table 2.
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Figure 8: The coe¢ cients for the year xed e¤ects in the regression reported in
column (1) of Table 3.
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Appendices
A Data
A.1 Finnish Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data
We use the Finnish Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data (FLEED) released by
Statistics Finland and containing information on all Finnish individuals in the age
group 16-70 living in Finland. Our panel contains a random sample of 1/3 of the
total population between the years 1996 and 2006. We drop all individuals who
were younger than 19 at the beginning of the year. This is to isolate the analysis
from the becoming-of-age phenomenon, i.e., it is popular among youngsters to opt
out immediately when they become of age at 18 years.Since we infer membership
to state church based on the church tax paid (a variable for membership is not
available), we cannot be certain about membership for the nonearners. We exclude
any observations for which the municipality tax paid (levied on the same tax base
as is church tax) was zero. We also exclude all foreigh citizens since a permanent
residence permit is a prerequisite for an immigrant to become accepted as a member
of the church. We further exclude any observation for which the deated church tax
paid belongs to the rst or the 99th percentile and clean the data from missing values
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on any of the variables included in the analysis.
A.1.1 Denitions of variables originating from FLEED
Church tax : Annual amount of church tax paid deated using the CPI and expressed
in year 2000 euros. An individual is church tax liable always the entire year if member
on January 1 during that year.
Household income: The CPI deated sum of annual wage income and capital
income as reported in the tax records . The variable consists of all variables with
nonmissing values. For married couples the meaure consists of at best of four com-
ponents: the sum of wifes wages and capital income and husbands wage and capital
income.
Age: Age as measured in years.
Education. Education is derived from each individuals International Standard
Classication of Education (ISCED) code and measured by a ve-class discrete vari-
able with the classes being: basic education, secondary or vocational, post-secondary,
bachelors degree, and graduate and Ph.D. degrees.
Kids: A dummy variable that obtains value one if there are any children living
in the household.
Married : A dummy variable that obtains value one if the individual is married.
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Divorced : A dummy obtaining value one if the individual is divorced.
A.2 Tax rates
Annual tax rates that vary across municipalities and over time are church tax and
general municipality tax, both levied on the taxable wage income. Both are available
from ALTIKA, a data base that contains municipality-level statistics for all Finnish
municipalities and is compiled by Statistics Finland. Church tax rates vary between
0.75 and 2.25 percent within the sample and vary at most within a municipality
by 0.85 percent percentage points over the period of observation. Municipality tax
varies between 15.00 percent and 21.00 percent across municipality/year-cells within
the sample and vary at most within a municipality by 2.5 percentage points over the
period of observation.
A.3 Computed Church Tax
Computed church tax : We obtain the church tax rates for municipality/year cells
from ALTIKA. These are multiplied with the tax base, (i.e., the sum of wages and
taxable transfers less deductions), for each individual in each year. Since transfers
and deductions are not available in FLEED, we obtain the correctly calculated tax
base for each individual over the period 1996-2006 from the Taxable Income database
34
originally drawn from the Finnish Tax Administrations database and compiled by
Statistics Finland.
B Leavers and Joiners
Table B-1: Individuals Joining State Church and Oping Out during 1999-2006
Year Joiners Leavers
1999 10,933 12,447
2000 11,220 13,566
2001 10,608 14,083
2002 10,377 16,077
2003 10,023 26,857
2004 9,365 27,009
2005 9,559 33,043
2006 10,116 34,952
Source: The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland; http://evl..
C What Does Church Membership Entitle to?
An individual who opts out from state church can still take part in religious activity
by, e.g., going to Sunday service, using family counceling, assigning ones children
to Sunday school or religious clubs for children, being helped by deaconal workers,
and receiving charity in the form of food packages or other form of nancial help
if in need. All the aforementioned activities are made available to non-members,
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although enjoying some of them may be facilitated by membership. The following
rites, events and services within the state church of Finland are exclusively made
available to members of church:
Church wedding: Both parts have to be members of church for a church wedding
to take place. The couple can be blessed in church without being members, the
procedure has however no legal consequences.
Baptizing: A person cannot be baptized to church without wanting to become a
member of that congregation.
Conrmation: A person cannot go through the conrmation without being a
member of state church.
Funeral: A christian funeral is to some extent limited to members of church,
however, unless a will opposes it ones descendants can arrange a religious funeral for
the deceased.
Godparenthood: A person cannot become a godparent to a baptized child without
being a member of state church.
Churchs magazine: Membership to state church entitles to a weekly magazine
with information about religious life and activity within the congregation.
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